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in Peter Auriol
Chiara Paladini*
Introduction
The focus of  this paper is the doctrine of  exemplar causality of  Pe-
ter Auriol, one of  the key figures of  the 14th century. He embodied 
the demands of  his time, in which the authority of  the ancients and 
their commentators no longer sufficed to justify the incorporation 
of  a particular theory into a philosophical system without any close 
examination of  the theory itself.
Auriol’s doctrine of  divine ideas and exemplar causality has al-
ready been considered by Alessandro Conti1. He has shown how 
Auriol’s critique of  the traditional approaches of  his predecessors 
ultimately led him to abolish the assumption that divine ideas exist. 
God’s knowledge of  creatures is explained in the following way: 
God knows his own essence. This knowledge indirectly refers to 
the particular creatures by different connotations. But these con-
notations play no role in creation, as ultimately the sole exemplar 
for creation remains God’s essence, to which alone, and not to the 
ideas, the character of  imitability can be ascribed. 
It still remains to explain how then the concept of  imitability is to 
be understood, or how a single object alone can serve as exemplar for 
many things. If  there are no ideas to serve as the intermediaries of  
1. A.D. Conti, Divine Ideas and Exemplar Causality in Auriol, «Vivarium» 38/1 
(2000), pp. 99-116.
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divine creation, then there can be no recourse to the principle of  the 
direct correspondence between ideatum and idea, which goes back to 
Augustine. In this system, the structural isomorphism between the 
intelligible and the real world — which was based on the theory that 
things correspond to the immutable ideas on the basis of  which they 
were created — can no longer be employed, as God (the exemplar) is 
one and simple, while the creatures (the ideata) are many and distinct 
from one another. Accordingly, the Franciscan theologian is obliged 
to rethink the concept of  exemplarity in order to explain the passage 
from the one to the many.
Like most scholastic authors Auriol discusses the doctrine of ideas 
in distinctions 35 and 36 of his commentary on book 1 of the Senten-
ces (Scriptum)2. In the following I’ll examine the quaestiones 2: “Utrum 
obiectum verum adaequatum intellectionis divinae sit essentia Dei, 
vel ens universale”, 3: “Utrum omnes creaturae secundum proprias 
suas naturas et rationes quidditativas sint in Deo vita et in verbo ip-
sius3” and 4: “Utrum Deus cognoscat singularia cognitione certa” of 
distinctio 35. I also occasionally refer to quaestio 1: “Utrum intelligere 
secundum suam rationem formalem vere et proprie sit in Deo” of 
distinctio 35 and to quaestio 2: “Utrum ideae sint ponendae in Deo” 
2. The only complete edition available of  Auriol’s commentaries on the Sen-
tences is Commentarii in primum librum Sententiarum Pars Prima, Romae 1596; Com-
mentarii in Secundum, Tertium, Quartum Libros Sententiarum Pars Secunda, Romae 
1605. It is unreliable however. The edition by E.M. Buytaert (Scriptum super pri-
mum Sententiarum, The Franciscan Institute Press, St. Bonaventure NY 1952-1956) 
includes the foreword (Prooemium) and distinctiones 1-8 of  the first book of  the 
commentary on the Sentences. A new edition of  Auriol’s works is in preparation. 
A number of  excerpts of  his work have already appeared in Electronic Scriptum, W. 
Duba et alii (edd.), <http://www.peterauriol.net/editions/electronicscriptum/
contents/> (last accessed: 16/01/2018). This edition, (abbreviated to ‘E-Scriptum’ 
in the following) forms the basis of  the present essay.
3. I have corrected the two erroneous transcriptions of  the Roman edition 
by checking them against the manuscript Vat. Borghese lat. 329 (abbreviated to 
Vb in the following). My transcription have since been incorporated into the the 
E-Scriptum. To facilitate comparison between the transcriptions, I give the source 
from both the new edition as well as the Roman edition.
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of distinctio 36. I first present the theories of the authors who are the 
principle targets of Auriol’s critique: Thomas Aquinas and Duns Sco-
tus (sections 1 and 2). Then Auriol’s criticisms of these views are dis-
cussed (section 3). Finally, I elaborate upon Auriol’s understanding 
of divine knowledge (section 4), in order to arrive at his proposal 
of exemplar causality: the doctrine of similitudo aequivoca (section 5).
1. Thomas Aquinas
According to Aquinas’s theory of  divine knowledge4, God initially 
comprehends himself  immediately as absolute and then as the sim-
ilarity of  things5. In the latter sense, he knows himself  as imitable 
in different ways by different things (as the similitudo of  all things), 
even if  only in an incomplete way and to varying degrees. This 
means that God knows in himself  all the possible ways in which he 
could serve as the model for creatures. God thereby also knows his 
own essence as it is multiplied into various ideas. 
In Summa Theologiae, I, q. 15 Aquinas explains exactly how this is 
to be understood6. Seeing as God’s essence is comprehended by God 
4. Cfr. J.H. Nicolas, L’origine première des choses, «Revue thomiste» 91 (1991), pp. 
181-218; V. Boland, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden-New 
York-Köln 1996; A.D. Conti, Paul of  Venice’s Theory of  Divine Ideas and its Sources, 
«Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale» 14 (2003), pp. 409-48; 
G.T. Doolan, Aquinas on Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes, The Catholic University 
of  America Press Press, Washington D.C. 2008; J.H. Weed, Creation as a Foundation 
of  Analogy in Aquinas, in J.M.J. Goris, H. Rikhof, H.J.M. Schoot (ed. by), Divine 
Transcendence and Immanence in the Work of  Thomas Aquinas.  A Collection of  Studies 
Presented at the Conference of  the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, December 15-17, 2005, 
Peeters, Leuven-Walpole 2009 (Publications of  the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, 13), 
pp. 129-147. 
5. Thomas de Aquino, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, I, P. Mandonnet 
(ed.), P. Lethielleux, Paris 1929, I, d. 27, q. 2, art. 3, co., p. 663.
6. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, I, Fratres Praedicatores (edd.), in Opera 
omnia. Editio Leonina, IV, Typographia Polyglotta, Roma 1888, q. 15, art. 1, ad 3, p. 199.
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himself  under the character of  imitability, it is only logically multiplied 
into various ideas. These are of  the same nature as him and therefore 
do not at all differ from the divine essence, which is absolutely one and 
simple and which contains nothing foreign to itself. Thus the numer-
ous relations of  reason arising from the divine intellectual act do not 
contradict divine unity, as they do not introduce real multiplicity into 
God. From Aquinas’ point of  view it is clear that a logical multiplicity 
doesn’t necessarily correspond to a real multiplicity. Purely logical rela-
tions (respectus rationis) could accordingly be multiplied through God’s 
intellectual act, without this implying a real multiplication. 
Neither do such relations call the autonomy of God’s intellection 
into question, as they only arise from the knowledge of a single object: 
His own essence. As Aquinas explains in Summa contra Gentiles, cap. 46, 
in the knowledge of all the ways in which it can be imitated by other 
beings, the divine essence plays the role of  a species intelligibilis7. There-
fore God has no need of other, external principles of  knowledge in or-
der to know many ideas.
Yet the act of  creation is not strictly-speaking conditioned by this 
cognitive process. In order to guarantee for God a certain power of  
decision during creation, Aquinas differentiates between a speculative 
and a practical knowledge in God and therefore also between two dif-
ferent ways in which the divine ideas are to be grasped8: 1) The specu-
lative knowledge (notitia simplicis intelligentiae), which pertains to all 
that is contained in God’s knowledge, independently of  whether it is 
actually brought into existence by God or not. In this regard the ideas 
are only pure rationes, i. e. logical concepts of  all that can be thought9. 
2) The practical knowledge (notitia visionis), by which God’s free will 
employs the ideas as models for actual creation. In this regard, the 
7. Thomas de Aquino, Summa contra Gentiles, I, Fratres Praedicatores (edd.), 
in Opera omnia. Editio Leonina, XIII, Typis Riccardi Garroni, Roma 1918, cap. 46, 
p. 137; c. 53, p. 151.
8. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, I, q. 15, art. 1, co., p. 199a.
9. Ibidem, I, q. 15, art. 3 ad 2, p. 204b.
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ideas are exemplars (exemplaria), i. e. the patterns to which God’s prac-
tical knowledge conforms for the creation of  all things10. The exemplaria 
are therefore the ideas of  those things that are terminus creationis, i. e. 
those that become the objects of  the act of  creation and that really 
exist, did exist or will exist. So conceived, the exemplar ideas guaran-
tee that the world is created by God, the artifex or intelligible cause, 
according to a pre-conceived order and as a whole as much as in all 
of  its parts. Accordingly, everything has God as its archetype and each 
being is created as it is according to its own idea, in which it participates.
Aquinas’ view leads him to deny the existence of  exemplaria, in the 
strict sense, for those things that do not possess a certain degree of  re-
ality and that will never come into being11.Whether and to what extent 
there are exemplaria for individuals is problematic. On the one hand in 
many places Aquinas claims that nature’s purpose is not directed to-
ward either the individual or the genus (whose concept can only be 
determined from within the species), but only toward the kind12; on the 
other hand he insists that God doubtlessly has ideas of  individuals, as 
they are the object of  divine causality and so also of  his practical knowl-
edge. Elsewhere he explicitly states that purely speculative knowledge 
of  matter along with that of  the specific forms (which correspond to 
the divine ideas) is sufficient for a complete knowledge of  individual 
compounds13. This is why Scotus and many of  his followers polemically 
allege that Aquinas’ doctrine denies that there are ideas of  individuals.
10. Ibidem, I, q. 15, art. 3 co., p. 204a.
11. There is for example no exemplar of  matter, which is a potential ens and 
which cannot exist nor be known without form (ibidem, I, q. 15, art. 3, ad 3, p. 204b); 
nor of  the genus, which exists merely as a formal principle and which together with 
difference constitutes the species; nor of  inseparable accidents, which are only ens in 
alio, i. e. formal principles that fall to the subject by chance (ibidem, I, q. 15, art. 3, 
ad 4, p. 204b); nor of  anything that exists not in itself, but only as a component of  a 
composite. To the extent that all of  these entities cannot be generated as such, God 
knows them only as concepts, as pure notiones contained in his power.
12. Ibidem, q. 85, art. 3, ad 4, p. 337a.
13. Ibidem, q. 14, art. 11, co., p. 183a.
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Aquinas’ doctrine provides no precise metaphysical collocation for 
the divine ideas. They arise from God’s act of  self-knowledge and con-
vey the knowledge of  creatures to God, because he knows himself  as 
imitable. The attempt to define their nature more precisely would only 
be undertaken by Aquinas’ followers.
2. Duns Scotus
Duns Scotus attempts to do just this in his doctrine of  ideas, as 
presented in dd. 35-36 of  his commentary on the Sentences14: in 
Scotus’s theory, the ideas become objects of  divine knowledge.
In this regard, Scotus rejects Aquinas’ distinction between 
speculative and practical knowledge. In his view, God does know all 
the possible by his essence, but there is no need to suppose an addi-
tional, practical kind of  knowledge, by which God would know the 
ideas as the ‘practical’ archetypes of  creatures. The ideas are initial-
ly all of  the same nature and share the same status15. They only are 
differentiated when the divine free will decides which of  them will 
14. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, dd. 26-48, C. Balić et alii (edd.), in 
Commissio Scotistica Internationalis (edd.), Opera omnia, VI, Typis Polyglottis 
Vaticanis, Città del Vaticano 1963, d. 35, q. un., pp. 245-270 and d. 36, q. un., pp. 
281-290; Id., Lectura in Librum Primum Sententiarum, I, dd. 8-45, C. Balić et alii 
(edd.), in Commissio Scotistica Internationalis (edd.), Opera omnia, XVII, Typis 
Polyglottis Vaticanis, Città del Vaticano 1966, d. 35, q. un., pp. 445-453; d. 36, q. 
un., pp. 468-471; Id., Reportatio parisiensis I-A, d. 36, qq. 1-4, T. Noone (ed.), in 
Id., Scotus on divine ideas: Rep. Paris. I-A, d. 36, «Medioevo» 24 (1998), pp. 395-
453. On the theory of  divine ideas, see M. McCord Adams, William Ockham, 
II, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame 1987 (Publications in Mediaeval 
Studies, 26), pp. 1042-1050; Noone, Scotus on Divine Ideas, pp. 359-453; T. Hoff-
mann, Creatura intellecta. Die Ideen und Possibilien bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick 
auf  Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius, Aschendorff, Münster 2002 (Bei-
träge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters – Neue 
Folge, 60). In addition, on Scotus’s theory of  divine ideas see the chapter of  E. 
Dezza, as well as that of  T. Noone and C.A. Vater in this volume.
15. Scotus, Reportatio parisiensis I-A, d. 36, qq. 3-4, n. 51, p. 442.
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be realized and which will not16. Instead Scotus differentiates be-
tween a first and a second object of  the same knowledge. The first 
is the absolutely simple essence of  God, which in turn represents 
within itself  the ideas (and therefore the creatures) as the second 
object of  his intellection. In contrast to his predecessors Scotus in-
sists that God has no need to know himself  under the character of  
imitability in order to know the creatures, as his essence is in itself  
representative of  many things.
But the two objects of  intellection, the divine essence and the 
ideas, are each related to divine knowledge in two different ways. To 
explain how God knows both himself  and the ideas, Scotus draws 
on the distinction between obiectum movens and obiectum terminans. 
While the divine essence can serve as both the cause of  his intellec-
tion and as the first terminus to which his knowledge actively directs, 
the ideas cannot never be the cause of  intellection, for that would be 
unworthy of  the divine intellect. They can therefore only be known 
as the terminus of  knowledge17. 
Regarding the status of  the ideas, Scotus contests Aquinas’s 
claim that they are to be understood as relations of  imitability. 
He argues as follows: if  the ideas were relations of  imitability, 
then such relations would already have to be treated as objects of  
divine knowledge. But then they would in turn be knowable only 
by means of  further relations of  knowledge, which themselves 
would require still further relations of  knowledge, such that ul-
timately God would never arrive at knowledge. In order to avoid 
such a regressus in infinitum, we must therefore hold fast to the 
principle according to which two relata must already exist prior to 
the relation. Thus the ideas should be produced as obiecta cognita 
by God himself  prior to the divine act of  cognition, in order to 
16. Ibidem, d. 36, qq. 3-4, nn. 18-19, pp. 430-431.
17. Id., Ordinatio, I, d. 36, q. un., nn. 39-43, pp. 286-288.
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subsequently be known by him18. This process is characterized by 
four moments, which are to be understood not chronological-
ly but purely logically: in the first moment God knows his own 
essence. In the second he creates the ideas as res cognitae and im-
mediately knows them, such that they become the terminus of  his 
intellection. In the third moment God compares the res cognitae 
with his essence, and determines that they imitate it to a certain 
extent. Only now do the relations of  imitability between the di-
vine essence and the known creatures arise. Finally in the fourth 
moment these relations are known by God19. 
In this way Scotus does not aim to deny that relations of  imi-
tability obtain between God and the ideas. But he does deny that 
they play a role in the production of  the ideas. They are rather the 
resulting outcome: God doesn’t know the ideas through the rela-
tions of  imitability, he rather forms the relations with the ideas, in 
that he produces the ideas in intelligible being and knows them. 
The priority of  the obiecta cognita over the relations of  knowledge 
in Scotus’s theory thus serves the establishment of  an intelligi-
ble world, which maintains the relative character of  a respectus 
but which nevertheless has its own place in the divine intellect. It 
therefore possesses a certain degree of  actuality in itself. 
For Scotus, this is what the condition for the intelligibility of  
the real world consists in. The ideas thus have objective existence in 
God’s mind, an esse obiectivum, on the basis of  which every being 
is what it is and can be known as such. Their mode of  being can 
neither be reduced to that of  a mental thing, nor it is the mode of  
being of  a real extra-mental thing, as the ideas’ mode of  being vis-
a-vis real existence remains incomplete up until their realization. 
Yet their realization only takes place through God’s free will. Scotus 
18. Ibidem, I, d. 35 q. un., n. 33, p. 258.
19. Ibidem, I, d. 35, q. un., n. 32, p. 258.
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thus refers to the being of  the ideas as a “diminished being20” (esse 
diminutum)21. 
Because Scotus no longer differentiates between pure rationes 
and true exemplars, to which the actual existence of  beings corre-
sponds, he is able to maintain that there are ideas of  all actual, but 
also of  all merely potential beings, and so not only of  those that 
possess a particular degree of  reality, as was the case for Aquinas. 
There are therefore ideas of  matter, of  separable and non-separable 
accidents, as well as of  all parts of  any whole22. 
3. Auriol’s critique
From Auriol’s point of  view the foregoing approaches don’t pro-
vide a satisfactory answer to the question of  how God can at once 
know himself  and many things (the ideas). The reason for this is 
for Auriol that his predecessors’ theories posit a inner difference 
within God and thus lead to a multiplication of  entities within the 
divine sphere, which Auriol absolutely wants to avoid. For him it is 
impossible for creatures to exist in God as distinct from one anoth-
er, whether as relations of  imitability, as Aquinas held, or as objects of  
knowledge, as proposed by Scotus.
20. On the esse diminutum, see A. Maurer, Ens diminutum. A Note on its Origin 
and Meaning, «Mediaeval Studies» 12 (1950), pp. 216-222; on the being of  divine 
ideas in Scotus’s theory see L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale Be-
stimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit 
(Duns Scotus – Suarez – Wolff  – Kant – Peirce), Meiner, Hamburg 1990 (Paradeigma-
ta, 9); on the different interpretations of  esse obiectivum in Scotus and Auriol see D. 
Perler, What Am I Thinking About? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on Intentional 
Objects, «Vivarium» 32/2 (1994), pp. 72-89.
21. Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 36, q. un., nn. 44-47, pp. 288-290.
22. Id., Reportatio parisiensis I-A, d. 36, q. 3-4, nn. 21-22, pp. 431-432.
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3.1 Auriol’s critique of  Aquinas’s theory
Auriol refuses two core points of  Aquinas’ doctrine of  divine 
ideas: 1. He denies that God needs a species, in this case his es-
sence, for knowing ideas and therefore creatures; 2. He denies 
that from this cognitive process a lot of  relations of  imitability 
arise, which are those respectus, logically different from each oth-
er, that Aquinas called ideas.
Auriol contests the first point in d. 35 q. 2 of  his Scriptum. On 
the basis of  a different theory of  knowledge, in d. 35, q. 2 of  his 
Scriptum Auriol denies that such a medium (the species) would be 
necessary for both the divine and the human cognitive processes. 
Indeed, the thesis that the essence of  God would act as a species 
intelligibilis is based on the false assumption of  knowledge being 
mediated by a species. He departs from the process of  human 
knowledge, by which divine knowledge can also be illuminated. 
Referring to the Aristotelian principle “frustra fit per plura quod fieri 
potest per pauciora23” Auriol claims that recourse to the interme-
diary of  species, which is supposed to grant our intellect access to 
reality, is by no means necessary in order to explain knowledge. 
Instead, our intellect itself  is fully capable of  accessing reality di-
rectly24. Auriol argues that if  knowledge would be mediated by a 
species, the species would be the first and only object known and 
the knowledge, as a consequence, would always reflect on the 
species itself  and never get anything different from it25. Hence, in 
23. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 2, art. 4 (E-Scriptum, p. 19, 982-983; X, p. 
783b, F): «Praeterea, superfluitas non est ponenda in rebus, quia frustra fit per plura 
quod fieri potest per pauciora, ut Philosophus dicit I Politicae et I Physicorum».
24. On Auriol’s theory of  perception see L. Lička, Perception and Objective Being: 
Peter Auriol on Perceptual Acts and their Objects, «American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly» 90 (2016), pp. 49-76 (and the literature cited therein). Further literature 
on perception and the significance of  species in Auriol is given in note 33 below.
25. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 2, art. 4 (E-Scriptum, p. 19, 958-964; 
X, p. 783b, B).
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the case of  God, this would mean that he would not know crea-
tures – which is untenable26.
On the second point: In q. 3 Auriol wants to prove that even a 
purely logical multiplication of  the divine essence into different ideas, 
which all imitate the one essence of  God in differing ways, necessar-
ily entails a kind of  real division of  the divine essence and therefore 
posits a kind of  real difference in God. Auriol argues that all these 
possible imitations of  the divine essence would be actually contained 
in God. A relation of  imitability between one object and another 
presupposes per definitionem the correspondence of  the object that 
imitates to the one that is imitated. If  an imitation true to its model 
is to occur, the divine essence would need to be really divided into 
different parts in the act of  cognition. But this can evidently be ruled 
out, as God’s essence is indivisible. The idea that God’s essence can 
only be logically (secundum rationem) divided and the resulting ideas 
accordingly only logically distinguished, must also be ruled out. For 
then we would have to assume that each idea really (secundum rem) 
imitates the entire divine essence – and consequently also that each is 
also an exemplar for the other ideas, just as God’s essence is27, which 
is untenable and Aquinas surely did not hold. 
For Auriol, Aquinas’s proposal doesn’t suffice to explain how God 
can know creatures through his own essence, as it is one while the 
creatures are many. The idea that the divine essence can be consid-
ered by God himself  from various points of  view is according to Au-
riol just as untenable as if  one were to say that it is actually composed 
of  different parts, because even a logical distinction between the di-
vine ideas would necessarily imply a sort of  real division in God.
26. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 2, art. 4 (E-Scriptum, p. 20, 1009-1016; X, p. 784a, D-E).
27. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 11, 572-576; X, p. 795b, F): «Et si di-
catur quod immo in plura secundum rationem, non valet quidem, quia quaelibet 
illarum rationum esset tota Dei essentia secundum rem, cum non posset esse pars 
eius. Tota vero essentia est omnium rerum similitudo, et per consequens quaelibet 
illarum rationum esset similitudo omnium».
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3.2 Auriol’s critique of  Duns Scotus’s theory
Scotus’ theory, compared to Aquinas’, must be credited for ascribing 
to the essence of  God the feature of  being absolutely and per se repre-
sentative of  many creatures28. In this way it breaks with Aquinas’ idea 
that the divine essence would be imitable by creatures only under the 
character of  respectus, that is to say by means of  cognitive relations. 
However, it makes the mistake of  multiplying the objects of  God’s 
mind in conceiving of  the ideas as secondary objects of  knowledge 
– which would necessarily put in God something different from God 
himself. 
In q. 2 Auriol aims to show that creatures can in no way be the 
primary, but nor can they be the secondary object of  God’s knowledge29. He 
argues that, even if  God himself  puts ideas as obiecta cognita in the 
divine essence, so that the divine intellect could recognize them af-
terwards, the primary object, i. e. the essence, and the secondary one, 
i. e. the ideas, would maybe coincide locally but not entitatively: they 
are not the same thing30. The problem is explained by Auriol using 
the metaphor of  a mirror: even if  the creatures were represented in 
God’s essence like an image in a mirror, nonetheless they would still 
28. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 10, 509-517; X, p. 795a, A): «Sed iste 
modus dicendi licet in hoc verus sit quod habitudines istas tollit, deficit tamen […] 
quia imaginatur quod divina essentia ponat res in esse exemplato et repraesentato, 
ita quod divinus intuitus primo terminetur ad essentiam, secundario vero ad crea-
turas repraesentatas per essentiam terminetur».
29. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 2, art. 4 (E-Scriptum, p. 22, 1112-1115; X, p. 785b, D): «Se-
cundo vero deficit in eo quod ait creaturas ut intellectas terminare per modum 
obiecti secundarii actum intellectionis divinae, nec esse formaliter idem in Deo 
comprehendere creaturas quam comprehendere essentiam, quasi sint duae com-
prehensiones et duo comprehensa terminantia intuitum obiective».
30. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 2, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 7, 350-353; X, p. 774b, D): «Sed 
manifestum est quod si creaturae relucerent in divina essentia tamquam obiecta 
secundaria, tunc Deus aliquid extra se positum intuetur. Extra, inquam, positum 
non situaliter, sed entitative, quia creaturae in tali esse positae non sunt ipse cre-
ator».
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differ from God, just as the image in the mirror and the mirror itself  
are not the same thing, although the image is actually in the mirror31. 
This would entail an alterity between God and ideas. Furthermore, 
God would know creatures by something different from himself, 
something that he himself  has created but nonetheless is different 
from him; and this is, in Auriol’s words, a sheer sacrilegium32.
As we will see, God’s knowledge can terminate in no other ob-
ject than his own essence. This remains one and undivided, and 
although it is connoted by manifold concepts, it cannot be deter-
mined by a multiplicity of  ideas, neither in the form of  objects ex-
isting in God nor in that of  relations of  imitability. Auriol’s critique 
of  the doctrine of  ideas leads to working out of  a new theory, in 
which no place is given to distinct exemplars: the theory of  exem-
plar causality as similitudo aequivoca.
4. Divine knowledge in Auriol
4.1. The divine knowledge of  specific natures
In order to avoid the multiplication of  logical and ontological entities 
in the divine essence, Auriol explains God’s knowledge of  creatures 
by means of  a unique object, that is its own essence. To understand 
Auriol’s conception of  divine knowledge, we must first come back to 
his general conception of  the cognitive process33. In q. 1, d. 35, which 
31. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 2, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 7, 333-335; X, p. 774b, A): «Sed 
vidisse speculum non est vidisse rem in speculo, immo sunt diversi termini et 
diversa vidisse. Ergo creaturae non videntur a Deo per essentiam suam tamquam 
per speculum». 
32. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 2, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 7, 353; X, p. 774b, D).
33. On Auriol’s theory of  knowledge see: F.A. Prezioso, La teoria dell’essere 
apparente nella gnoseologia di Pietro Aureoli, «Studi Francescani» 46 (1950), pp. 15-43; 
Id., La species medievale e i prodromi del fenomenismo moderno, CEDAM, Padova 1963 
(Serie filosofica – Saggi e monografie, 42); Id., Ricerche sulla gnoseologia medievale, 
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treats of  God’s intelligere, Auriol claims that God’s knowledge acts to-
ward (“se habet”) his own essence in the same way that human knowl-
edge acts toward quality34. What exactly does he mean by this?
Auriol has thought through the cognitive process anew. In his sys-
tem, knowledge no longer occurs through the impression of  the ob-
ject upon the cognitive faculty. In opposition to prior tradition, which 
had ascribed to the intellect the passive role of  the reception of  the 
species, Auriol claims that the cognitive faculty is actually active, in that 
it is able to relate itself  to something and to let mental objects appear, 
or even to produce them in the truest sense of  the word. According 
to Auriol, two things come together in knowledge: an act of  thought, 
through which an image (similitudo) of  the object is produced, and the 
appearance of  the object, to which the act of  thought relates itself35.
«Antonianum» 53/3-4 (1978), pp. 641-646; K. Michalski, Le criticisme et le sceptici-
sme dans la Philosophie du XIV siècle, in Bulletin international de l’Académie polonaise des 
sciences et des lettres, Imprimerie de l’Université, Cracovie 1925, pp. 41-122; S. Vanni 
Rovighi, L’intenzionalità della conoscenza secondo P. Aureolo, in L’homme et son destin 
d’après les penseur du Moyen Âge. Actes du premier Congrès International de Philosophie 
médiévale, Louvain-Bruxelles 28 Août – 4 Septembre 1958), Nauwelaerts, Louvain-Paris 
1960, pp. 673-680; Id., Una fonte remota della teoria husserliana dell’intenzionalità, in Stu-
di di filosofia medievale II. Secoli XIII e XIV, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1978, pp. 283-298; 
K.H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the age of  Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the 
Foundations of  Semantics, 1250-1345, Brill, Leiden, New York-København-Köln 1988 
(Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelaters, 22), p. 112; R.L. Fried-
man, Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Predication, in S. Ebbesen, R.L. Friedman 
(ed. by), Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, The Royal Danish Academy 
of  Sciences and Letters, Copenhagen 1999 (Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser, 77), 
pp. 415-430; D. Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, Klostermann, Fran-
kfurt am Main 2002 (Philosophische Abhandlungen, 82), pp. 253-317; Id. Zweifel und 
Gewissheit. Skeptische Debatten im Mittelalter, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2006 
(Philosophische Abhandlungen, 92), particularly pp. 239-245, 316-317, 266-272; T. 
Kobusch, Adaequatio rei et intellectus. Die Erläuterung der Korrespondenztheorie der 
Wahrheit, in M. Enders, J. Szaif (ed. by), Die Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs der 
Wahrheit, de Gruyter, Berlin 2006, pp. 149-166.
34. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 1, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 26, 1468-1471; 
X, p. 768b, C): «Ad primum quidem quod intelligere in Deo non est qualitas, sed 
sic se habet ad deitatem sicut in creaturis ad qualitatem».
35. On the problem of  cognition in Auriol, see in particular R.L. Friedman, 
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But the act of  intellect and the resulting similitudo of  the object 
only concerns the subjective part of  the process: It is no more than 
a quality in the subject36. Through an intellectual act, the subject 
actively relates itself  to a specific object within its mental “field of  
vision”. In Auriol’s words the subject “posits” the object in “inten-
tional existence37”.
But for Auriol this doesn’t suffice to explain how knowledge 
takes place. For the subjective act of  thought can also theoreti-
cally prescind from the real presence of  the object or produce vi-
sions that are either deceptive or to which nothing corresponds in 
reality38. If  true knowledge is to occur, it is also necessary that the 
object, to which the intentional act of  thought relates itself, ap-
pears to the knower39. The result of  this process is not a qualitative 
Act, Species, and Appearance: Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition and Consciousness, 
in G. Klima (ed. by), Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval 
Philosophy, Fordham University Press, New York 2015, pp. 141-65. See also Id., Peter 
Auriol, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/auriol/>, in  The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed. by), 2016 
(accessed: 01/02/2018). See also literature cited in note 33.
36. Auriol treats the topic extensively in Scriptum, d. 35, q. 1, art. 1 (E-Scrip-
tum, p. 11-15, 569-763; X, p. 755a-758a).
37. On intentionality in Auriol, cfr. Vanni Rovighi: L’intenzionalità della cono-
scenza, pp. 673-680; Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter; Id., What Am 
I Thinking About?, pp. 72-89; K.H. Tachau, Some Aspects of  the Notion of  Intentional 
Existence at Paris, 1250-1320, in Ebbesen, Friedman (ed.by), Medieval Analyses, pp. 
331-53; J. Biard, Intention et présence. La notion de presentialitas au XIVe siècle, in D. 
Perler (ed. by),  Ancient and Medieval Theories of  Intentionality,  Brill, Leiden-Bo-
ston-Köln 2001 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 76), pp. 
265-282: 270-77; F. Amerini, Realism and Intentionality: Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Aureo-
li, and William Ockham in Discussion, in S.F. Brown, T. Dewender, T. Kobusch (ed. 
by), Philosophical debates at Paris in the early fourteenth century, Brill, Leiden 2009 
(Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 102), pp. 239-60.
38. So for example someone traveling on a river in a boat will see the trees on 
the bank as if  they were moving, or someone who plunges a pole into water will 
see it as bent even though it is not.
39. The subjective manner of  considering the object and the reality of  the 
object considered must agree with one another. If  this is not the case, insight 
remains misleading. This is why Russell Friedman corrected the first interpreta-
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subjective modification in the knower, but an objective concept, i. 
e. a new “mode of  being” added to the object in that it “appears” 
to the subject: an appearing being (esse apparens or esse obiectivum). 
This mode of  being is one that is dependent on the intellect, but 
it is not to be identified with either the intentional act of  thought 
or a quality in the subject. It is rather the object itself that, in being 
known, changes its condition and becomes a known object40. On 
this new model the object alone is not able to cause knowledge, 
yet nor does the act of  cognition suffice to produce knowledge. 
Subject and object partake in its realization in equal measure. 
They are as it were two sides of  the same coin. 
So when Auriol goes on to say that God’s knowledge acts to-
ward his own essence just as human knowledge does toward quali-
ty, he means that God’s intellect relates itself  directly to his essence 
(and only to this), and then posits it in apparentia obiectiva, in the 
same way that in the human cognitive process the intentional act 
relates itself  to a object in its mental ‘field of  vision’ and posits it 
in esse intentionali. The divine essence definitively remains the only 
object to which the divine intelligere directs itself  and in this sense it 
is correct to say that God knows only himself.
Yet this is not the end of  the divine cognitive process. Auriol 
also applies the schema just described to divine knowledge. Just 
as in the human process the object must appear to the knower in 
tions of  Auriol as a conceptualist and proto-nominalist and by contrast defined his 
doctrine as a moderate conceptualism: the receptive moment has doubtlessly with-
drawn in favor of  the productive function of  the intellect. Nevertheless, knowle-
dge must guarantee its relation to the inner structure of  the extra-mental object. 
Cfr. Friedman, Peter Auriol on Intentions, pp. 415-430. 
40. On this see T. Kobusch, Petrus Aureoli. Philosophie des Subjekts, in T. Ko-
busch (hrsg. von), Philosophen des Mittelalters: Eine Einführung, Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2000, pp. 236-249: 241-244; Id., Das Verborgene und das 
Erscheinende. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Petrus Aureoli, in M. Gerwing, H.J.F. Re-
inhard (hrsg. von), Wahrheit auf  dem Weg. Festschrift für Ludwig Hödl, Aschendorff, 
Münster 2009, pp. 246-266.
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order for knowledge to occur, so God must appear to himself  as his 
own object. That is the key that enables Auriol to justify the divine 
knowledge of  creatures, without them having to become objects 
of  God’s knowledge.
For this, Auriol draws on the semantic device of  denominatio 
and differentiates between two ways in which knowledge can be 
considered: terminative and denominative41. In q. 2 Auriol claims that 
something is understood terminatively if  it is the object to which 
the act of  cognition is directed. As we have already seen, In God’s 
case, that can only be the divine essence. In this sense the creatures 
are in no way the object of  divine knowledge42. The result of  this 
process is the apparentia, the appearance, the presentness to God of  
God himself. The creatures however can thereby also be known 
denominative, by the fact that what appears in God indirectly (in obli-
quo43), is the undivided totality of  all creatures44. 
The use of  the semantic tool denominatio or “connotation45” 
to explain divine knowledge enables Auriol to support his central 
41. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 2 art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 10, 479-485; X, 
p. 776b, C). On this see Conti, Divine ideas, p. 114.
42. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 2, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 3, 142-146; X, p. 771b, B): «nulla 
intellectio est in Deo quae terminetur ad creaturas positas in esse prospectu, aut 
ad aliquid aliud a Deo».
43. It is clear that appearance in the divine realm is of  another nature to appea-
rance in the human realm. While the objects of  knowledge appear to the creatures 
in a diminished, intentional being, God’s essence and the creatures present in him 
appear to him in divine, real being.
44. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 1, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 26, 1368-27, 1375; X, p. 767a, D): 
«Unde patet quod intelligere est quidam conceptus connotativus, hoc est aggrega-
tivus duorum, illius scilicet qualitatis et apparentiae obiectivae, quae connectuntur 
se ipsis et concurrunt ad unam perfectam rationem ipsius intellectionis; qualitas 
quidem formaliter et in recto, apparentia vero extrinsece et in obliquo. Secundum 
hoc oportet intelligi de deitate quod ultra eam divinum intelligere nihil addit nisi 
apparentiam obiectivam connexam cum deitate, ita quod deitas ut connectens 
apparentiam obiectivam, est enim id cui omnis res apparet et virtute cuius /Vb 
365vb/ omnis res sibi apparet».
45. Auriol uses here the two terms denominatio and connotatio as they were 
synonimous. 
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thesis, according to which God’s knowledge has no object other 
than the divine essence. For denominative knowing does not in any 
way require that something (in this case the creatures) is directly the 
terminus or object of  divine knowledge. This kind of  knowledge in-
stead only require that something is known insofar as it is indirectly 
(in obliquo) connoted by something else. Accordingly creatures are 
known to God in that they are indirectly connoted by the divine 
essence, although they are not the direct object of  God’s knowl-
edge. As God’s essence appears to himself, the apparentiae obiectivae 
represented in it also appear, which in turn refer to the creatures. It 
alone suffices as the foundation of  the infinite connotations of  all 
creatures. 
Appearance is a particular kind of  relationship that doesn’t 
come under any of  the three kinds of  relations provided by Ar-
istotle in the Metaphysics46. It is not a numeric relation, such as 
equality, similarity and identity, as it does not express any sim-
ilarity whatsoever between the two concepts. It is not a causal 
relation, as appearance implies neither an acting nor an suffer-
ing on the part of  either of  the elements involved. Nor is it a 
relation of  measured to the measure, as appearance pertains to 
the object that appears47. For Auriol it is important to clearly dis-
tinguish connotation from relation, in order to clearly distance 
himself  from those authors, particularly Aquinas, who conceive 
of  the ideas in God as relations of  imitability (respectus imitabili-
tatis). Such relations do not exist between connotative extremes, 
because their relationship is not due to a common similarity, as is the 
case with extremes related to one another. On the contrary, the 
connoting item (the divine intelligere) refers directly to something 
quite different (i. e. the divine essence) than that to which it refers 
46. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 1020b26-1021b11.
47. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 1, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 29, 1481-1485; 
X, p. 768b, E-F).
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indirectly (i. e. the creatures). In order to explain this point, Au-
riol gives same examples of  connotation: humanity (humanitas) 
and flesh (caro). These concepts always refer to something else: 
humanity is always the humanity of  a human being, just as flesh 
entails a reference to something whose flesh it is. In the same way 
the “rudder” (remus) connotes the what is “ruddered” (remitam 
rem), and the wing (ala) connotes the winged (alatum). They re-
fer to one another, because their being named is always linked in 
obliquo to something distinct from them. Relations by contrast are 
linked to one other by a respectus that mediates between the two 
extremes; each is thus related to the other through something 
common to both. An example is the case of  Socrates and Plato, 
who are both white and thus similar, because white inheres in 
both of  them48. 
With this argument, Auriol wants to show that there are no 
particular similarities that mediate between the divine intellect 
and his essence. The manifold relations of  imitability of  the tra-
dition are replaced by a single connotative relationship, the one 
48. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 1, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 25, 1276-1301; X, p. 765b, F-766a, 
D): «Talia igitur absoluta dicuntur connotantia absque hoc quod interveniat 
relatio media inter absolutum et connotatum, quod quidem patet. Tum quia 
talis ratio absoluta non concipitur per modum fundamenti alicuius habitudinis; 
unde non dicitur ad aliud ut fundamentum relationis, sed magis per propriam 
rationem, humanitas enim ex hoc quod est humanitas est humanitas alterius, 
et caro in eo quod caro est alterius. Non sic autem de his quae dicuntur alterius 
per modum fundamenti, album enim, licet sit simile alteri albo in eo quod al-
bum, non tamen vere dicitur quod album sit alterius album. Nunc autem vere 
dicitur quod caro est alterius caro et humanitas alterius humanitas (…) nam 
manus denominat manuatum et caput capitatum et ala alatum et remus navem 
sive remitam rem, ut Philosophus dicit in Praedicamentis”. (…) “Sic igitur patet 
differentia inter <conceptus> connotativos et relativos, quia connotativi inclu-
dunt rationem absolutam cum termino, sine habitudine media connectente, 
quia ipsamet ratio absoluta connectit propter sui condicionem, sicut patet de 
ratione humanitatis et carnis et de ratione alae et remi. Conceptus vero relati-
vi, ultra rationem absolutam et terminum, includunt habitudinem mediam et 
respectum».
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holding between God’s essence (the Godhead) and the creatures. 
This is also why God has no need of  intermediaries, be they rela-
tions of  reason or known objects, in order to know the creatures 
perfectly. By the mere fact that the simple ratio of  Godhead “ap-
pears” to God himself, the connoted creatures also immediately 
appear to him. his knowledge of  each specific nature is therefore 
direct, precise, and not mediated by anything, for the undivided 
ratio of  Godhead alone suffices for God to completely and pre-
cisely know each specific nature.
A metaphor is helpful to explain this. Auriol writes:
Non debet ergo impossibile extimari quod una deitas indivisibilis 
possit esse similitudo plurium quidditative distinctorum; est autem 
sic quod si imago, lucens in speculo, esset indivisibilis sicut species 
existens in intellectu, viso unico et indivisibili, utpote imagine illa 
visa, tota facies et distinctio partium eius cognita videretur. Sic igi-
tur in proposito, visa deitate, quae est res simplicissima, quamvis sit 
deitas tota subsistens, dicitur tota entitas creata visa esse distincte, 
cuius ratio est quia deitas est similitudo eminens lapidis, et per con-
sequens quidam eminens lapis. Et ideo ea visa dicitur lapis cognitus 
eminenter49.
When someone looks at his reflected image in a mirror, he 
sees his face as a whole and not as divided in distinct parts. None-
theless he still sees each particular part. In the same way, when 
God’s own essence is “illuminated” and appears to God himself, 
God also immediately sees the undivided totality of  creatures that 
also appear. He sees for example the stone, as the stone shines in 
God’s essence as in a mirror and is eminently represented by it. 
This is why the becoming present of  God’s essence to himself  
is also the becoming present of  all creatures to him. The divine 
intellect is immediately directed solely toward his own essence as 
the first terminus of  his knowledge, but he simultaneously knows 
49. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 16, 827-834; X, p. 799b, B-C).
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all the infinite connotations and thus the creatures50. In this way 
God is the exemplar cause of  all specific natures which differ from 
one another51. 
But it is important for Auriol that God knows also each particu-
lar individual which exists in the world. In what follows, we will see 
how Auriol develops this point. 
4.2. The Divine knowledge of  Individuals 
The notion of  connotation had enabled Auriol to clarify how God 
can know the different specific natures to be found in the world 
simply by knowing his own essence. What he had still left unex-
plained is how God can have exact cognition of  each individual 
within a species. To put it differently: what is connoted by the di-
vine essence in God’s process of  self-cognition is e.g. the nature 
of  man or stone, not this man or this stone as individuals (entia 
signata). Now, in order to safeguard the Christian principle of  God’s 
providence and omniscience, Auriol had to account for the fact that 
divine cognition extends to singulars. 
This issue fell directly within a debate between two opposite 
perspectives, i. e. the view that divine cognition must necessarily 
include individuals, and the idea, attributed to Averroes, that God 
50. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 2, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 11, 552-557; X, p. 777b, C): «Licet 
enim essentia divina simplicissima sit in se, est tamen plures in connotatis. Quam-
vis enim essentia quae terminat intuitum divinum simplex et una sit tam re quam 
ratione, nihilominus ea cognita plura dicuntur cognita, non quidem terminative, 
sed denominative, ut patet ex praedictis».
51. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 12, 592-597; X, p. 796a, C-D): «Pri-
ma quidem quod deitas est similitudo propria cuiuslibet specificae naturae non 
quidem secundum aliam et aliam perfectionem quam habeat in se, aut secundum 
aliam et aliam rationem, ut praedicti imaginari videntur, immo sub una et eadem 
simplici perfectione secundum rem et rationem, quae importatur per deitatem, 
exemplar est omnium entitatum».
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has no cognition of  individuals. Aquinas, for example, accused 
Averroes of  denying God’s cognition of  creatures in order to pre-
serve his unity and simplicity. Against this view, Aquinas argued 
that it amounted to claiming that the producer (in this case, God) 
fails to know his own products (creatures). But this is impossible. 
Hence, God is bound to know individuals as well, insofar as he is 
the cause of  each of  them52.
Aquinas’ argument strikes Auriol as inconsistent. The view that 
God knows individual creatures since he is their cause seems to Au-
riol insufficient to ensure his cognition of  individuals. He holds it is 
necessary to distinguish, within God, efficient productivity from exem-
plary productivity. According to Aquinas, God produces all individual 
creatures in the world (i. e. individuals, entia signata) as efficient cause. 
By contrast, as exemplar cause he knows within himself  the models 
through which he creates things, and recognizes within himself  all 
the possible ways in which he can be imitated by things – e.g. by a 
man or a stone. God, therefore, is a similitudo of  the specific natures 
of  things. He is not a similitudo of  each individual falling within a 
given species and possessing individual differences which distinguish 
it from another similar individual (in other words, God is not directly 
a similitudo of  e.g. Socrates and Plato). However – so runs Auriol’s 
argument – even though God is the (efficient) cause of  all individu-
als, this cannot be the reason why he cognizes them as signata. For 
God, as exemplar cause, when cognizing himself  does not recognize 
himself  as the similitudo of  singulars, but only as the direct similitudo 
of  universal forms53 – which was true for Auriol himself.
Thus, Auriol had to explain how God, as exemplar cause, can 
come to know individuals. Once again, if  we are to make sense 
of  Auriol’s view, we must turn to his conception of  human cog-
52. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, I, d. 35, q. 1, art. 3, 
in co., p. 816.
53. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 4, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 15, 730-739; 
X, p. 814b, D-E).
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nition. Auriol discusses the issue of  the divine cognition of  singu-
lars in relation to human cognition in Scriptum, d. 35, q. 454.
One of  the basic principles of  Auriol’s theory of  cognition is 
that the first thing our mind apprehends of  a sensible object we 
encounter is the general notion of  it. Since Auriol regards com-
mon natures as non-existent, individuals are the only truly existing 
things. Yet they are not directly cognizable to our intellect. This is 
because no singular possesses an individual intelligible property, 
i. e. a truly individuating property which contracts the species and 
reduces it to an individual – as posited by Scotus. Auriol holds 
that individuals are cognized by the intellect in an abstract way at 
first, through simple and general concepts (ultimately, as “vague 
individuals”, i. e. as concrete examples of  a certain essence). In 
Scriptum, d. 35 q. 4, he claims that, in order to know an individ-
ual in its own individuality and to distinguish it from a similar 
one, the intellect must accomplish a second operation, which is 
performed through imagination (mediante imaginatione55). Imagi-
nation connotes, i. e. “marks”, the sensible object. In other words, 
to the simple (abstract) concept which the intellect forms of  it 
and which is common to all similar objects, imagination adds the 
aspects identifying it as a particular object, distinct from all oth-
ers. Auriol describes the individuation performed by the imagi-
nation as an intentional setting of  the object in space and time. 
By intellectually situating the object in a specific position in space 
and/or a specific moment in time (e.g. now or later), imagination 
“marks” the simple concept of  the cognized object (the vague 
individual) and cognizes it distinctly as an individual object, i. e. a 
signatum. Thus, imagination produces the phantasm: a represen-
tation of  the object that is no longer generic but “marked”, i. e. 
54. On this see R.L. Friedman, Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of  Singulars, 
«Vivarium» 38/1 (2000), pp. 177-193.
55. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 4, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 12, 602-604; 
X, p. 812b, E-F).
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encompassing its distinctive traits as an individual. This represen-
tation is then transmitted to the intellect, which uses it to know 
the object in its specific individuality and to distinguish it from all 
similar objects. 
Auriol presents this process as the formation of  a linear opposi-
tion. This is created by the mind through an intentional act whose ex-
tremes are the cognizing subject and the cognized object. The mind 
sets the object of  cognition at a specific point (the endpoint of  the 
intentional act, represented by a line), and thus knows it distinctly 
as a particular and determined individual. Each individual is situated 
at the end of  a specific intentional line: all similar individuals, then, 
differ from one another by their particular (intentional) position. 
Now, as in the case of  human knowledge, the divine intellect 
knows the universal directly, and individuals only in a mediated way56. 
God does not know individuals directly because the intellect (by 
its own nature, one might say) conceives specific unity before indi-
vidual unity. In other words, it conceives each quiddity or nature 
(such as humanity or horseness) as a single and undivided whole, 
even though these quiddities do not correspond to anything real 
in the extra-mental world, but are only a conceptual or represen-
tational unity57. In addition, as we have seen, the divine intellect 
conceives each quiddity in an eminent way (i. e. in a more noble 
and perfect way compared to how each quiddity can manifest itself  
in individuals). Therefore, the divine intellect knows creatures in 
the endless connotations of  its own essence, and not directly the 
creatures Socrates and Plato, but only the universal man that stands 
in the same relation of  representation to both Socrates and Plato. 
This means that it does not distinguish them directly. It only grasps 
them as a single specific unity. 
56. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 4, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 22, 1111-1112; X, p. 820a, C): «Est 
ergo considerandum quod deitas non potest immediate esse similitudo appropria-
ta cuilibet individuo signate et indistincte, potest tamen mediate».
57. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 4, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 17, 870-879; X, p. 816b, D).
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Auriol clarifies all this by referring to how God knows angels 
and souls. Since angels and souls are incorporeal substances, 
they possess no concrete nature. Hence, no angel can have a 
concrete nature similar to that of  another angel – unlike corpo-
real substances, which possess concrete natures and therefore 
can present some similarities. This is the case of  Socrates and 
Plato: they have two similar concrete natures and can both be 
represented by the species man. Consequently, in the case of  an-
gels (and all other incorporeal substances) there is no multitude 
of  individuals that can be represented under a single species, but 
only – so to speak – a multitude of  singulars, each with his own 
specific ratio. To put it differently: each angel and each incorpo-
real substance represents a specific unity in itself. Since there is 
nothing concrete that can make one angel akin to another, i. e. 
that can make two or more angels appear similar, numeric unity 
coincides with specific unity. Hence, with respect to the divine 
intellect each incorporeal substance stands as a single specific 
unity, i. e. in the same way as each nature or quiddity, such as 
man or stone, stands with respect to the intellect: as an undi-
vided whole. Therefore, God can know incorporeal substances 
directly, just as he knows all specific natures directly58. 
Things are quite different in the case of  corporeal substances. 
These possess concrete natures which may present specific simi-
larities. Therefore, several individuals may be intellectually repre-
sented by a single specific image. This means that numerical unity 
(the unity belonging to each signatum individual) does not coincide 
with specific unity59. God knows creatures directly in his essence 
according to their specific unities. This is because, as we have said, 
he recognizes himself  as the direct similitudo of  specific natures, as 
man or stone, and not as the direct similitudo of  singulars, as this 
58. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 4, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 20, 991-1008; X, p. 818A-B). 
59. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 4, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 20, 1015-1019; X, p. 818b, D-E).
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man or this stone. As a result, he must know individuals in a differ-
ent way, namely in a mediated way.
However, God’s cognition of  singulars cannot occur in the way 
we have described while speaking of  the human cognition of  singu-
lars. The human intellect actively “marks” individuals with the help 
of  imagination (strictly speaking, imagination is no sensible faculty, 
but, like the senses, it comes into contact with material objects). Yet 
this cannot happen in the case of  God. He possesses no imagination 
and has no contact with the material world. His cognition is purely 
intellectual, hence abstract. In other words, God cannot perform di-
rectly a cognitive act setting singular objects in a spatio-temporally 
determined intentional representation, since his cognizing intellect 
transcends time and space60. Human beings distinguish two perfectly 
similar individuals by placing them on two different intentional lines 
and producing in their mind an intentional opposition between their 
own intellect and either individual. By contrast, God does not direct-
ly perform any such operation of  signatio or demonstratio, as Auriol 
calls it. Suggesting he does would mean debasing the divine intellect 
and equating it with the human one. 
Auriol’s strategy to solve this impasse is the following. First, he 
claims that God performs no act of  signatio of  singular objects, and 
yet he knows all the actual or possible cognitive acts directed by all cre-
ated intellects towards all existing singular objects, and he is the exem-
plar cause of  each of  them. Thus, Auriol believes he can ensure God’s 
complete cognition of  each sensible singular (individuum corporeum et 
quantum). The latter is not to be viewed as just an object that can be 
“marked” as singular (substratum quod demonstratur), but as a singular 
that is actually signatum by an act of  the soul, i. e. set within a certain 
spatial and/or temporal representation by any cognitive faculty. Let 
us explain this by referring to language. God cognizes the simple con-
cepts of  existing things, expressed by nouns such as “man” or “stone”. 
60. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 4, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 22, 1117-1119; X, p. 820a, D-E).
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But he also cognizes the composite concepts we get when we add a 
demonstrative adjective to a noun, and say “this man” or “this stone”, 
thereby making particular what would otherwise remain general and 
indicating a specific object61. 
Second, Auriol claims – and this is arguably his most noteworthy 
thesis – that each quiddity, such as man or stone, contains countless 
signabilitates passivae, each of  which represents a certain disposition 
or susceptibility to be marked as particular and determined. This 
signa bilitas passiva is the essential condition for something to be-
come the object of  an act of  signatio by any cognitive faculty. This is 
particularly clear in the case of  human beings. When human beings 
are cognizing a sensible object, their cognitive faculties connote, i. 
e. “mark”, a sensible object at a second stage, in that they add to the 
simple concept formed at a first stage – and shared by all similar 
objects – those aspects identifying it as a particular object. Now, Au-
riol claims that God knows the signabilitas passiva of  every specific 
abstract nature, such as man or stone, regardless and independent-
ly of  any act of  signatio. This means that God knows the disposition 
or susceptibility of  each specific quiddity to be exemplified by dif-
ferent individuals. Yet his intellect does not directly “mark” each of  
them through a distinct intellectual act, for he does not recognize 
himself  as the direct and appropriate similitudo of  each individual 
61. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 4, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 24-25, 1235-1246; X, p. 821b-822a, 
F-A): «Sic igitur patet quomodo Deus potest cognoscere individuum corporeum 
et quantum, non enim potest nisi intelligendo illud cum signatione, ut hunc la-
pidem vel illum florem. Cum signatione autem quam intellectus suus exerceat, 
hoc facere non potest […] Intelligit ergo hunc lapidem et hunc florem, signatum 
signatione quam alius exercet, videlicet imaginatio vel sensus vel quae possibilis 
est exerceri, licet nullus actu exerceat. Cum enim omnis sensus et omnis sensa-
tio, tam interior quam exterior, possibilis exempletur per divinam essentiam, 
quae est similitudo eminens omnium rerum, vel potius omnia eminenter, ne-
cesse est quod ipsa similitudo sit huius lapidis et illius, in quantum similitudo est 
lapidis particularis et signationis vel signabilitatis passivae, ita quod totum hoc 
coniunctum est immediate exemplatum distincte, nam sine signatione passiva 
distincte exemplari non potest».
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signatum. However, through the many connotations of  his essence 
he cognizes not only specific natures, but their dispositions to be in-
dividualised. Therefore, God cognizes individuals as well, if  only in 
a mediated way. And through his single essence, he is the exemplar 
cause of  each of  them62. 
Within Auriol’s system the divine essence turns out to be the 
only exemplar for the creation of  both specific natures and individ-
uals. Let us see now how this is possible according to Auriol. 
5. Auriol’s theory of exemplar causality as similtudo aequivoca
As the doctrine of  the ideas was the model by which God’s rational 
and ordered creation was explained, Auriol must now formulate 
a new concept of  exemplarity consonant with his conception of  
divine knowledge in order to uphold the principle of  rational cre-
ation. If  the only object of  divine knowledge is Godhead, this must 
also be the only exemplar of  all creatures and the sole ground of  
the multiplicity of  forms present in reality.
To develop an appropriate theory, in d. 35, q. 3 Auriol draws 
on Averroes. In order to preserve God’s simplicity and perfection, 
Averroes claims that God only knows a unique object: his own 
62. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 4, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 25, 1246-1257; X, p. 822a, A-C): 
«Praecedunt autem signationem aut signabilitatem passivam signationes activae 
omnium sensationum et imaginationum possibilium, quae etiam exemplantur, 
propter quod divinus intuitus ad essentiam terminatus attingit aequivalenter et 
aequipollenter hunc lapidem et hunc florem et omne signatum individuum con-
stitutum ex sua signatione seu demonstratione et ex substrato quod demonstra-
tur. Et apparet quod, licet individuum substratum attingat mediante signatione 
vel signabilitate passiva, tamen immediate totum attingit quicquid se tenet ex 
parte individui […] Ex quo manifestum relinquitur quomodo Deus, intelligendo 
suam essentiam, non solum intelligit rerum omnium quiditates, immo signa-
tiones passivas earum in quolibet individuo, quamvis per intellectum suum illas 
non signet».
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essence63. Auriol now attempts to argue in favour of  Averroes’s 
doctrine, as it enables him to explain how manifold creatures can 
arise from the knowledge of  a single object. He can thereby cre-
ate a new system that only envisages a single relationship of  ex-
emplarity: the one between the Godhead and the creatures, the 
similitudo aequivoca. 
Primarily Auriol accuses Aquinas of  having misunderstood Aver-
roes when he claimed that he had denied God the knowledge of  
creatures. According to Aquinas, Averroes had only accorded to God 
a universal and confused knowledge of  beings, a scientia universalis, 
not particularis. For Auriol, by contrast, Averroes only wanted to 
deny God a direct knowledge of  individuals. Auriol’s argument runs 
as follows: according to Aristotle the expression “in universali” can 
be taken in two different ways, either as knowledge of  species or 
as knowledge of  individuals. In Auriol’s opinion, in saying that God 
can only know universals, Averroes only wants to deny that God’s 
intellectual act relates to individual creatures, as this would not be in 
accordance with divine perfection. But this does not mean that God 
would lack knowledge of  the specific principles according to which 
creatures are created64. For Averroes knowledge of  the species is suf-
ficient to guarantee both divine perfection and God’s knowledge of  
the world. An example from geometry serves to illustrate this: some-
one who knows that a triangle has three corners has no need to know 
all of  the really existing triangles in order to better understand the 
form of  a triangle65.
63. Averroes, Aristotelis metaphysicorum libri XIIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in 
eosdem commentariis et epitome, Theophrasti metaphysicorum liber, XII, c. 51, in Aristo-
telis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, Venetiis 1562 (an. repr. Nachdruck Minerva, 
Frankfurt a. M. 1962), VIII, p. 337, B-C.
64. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 3, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 4, 164-171; X, 
p. 790a, B-C).
65. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 3, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 4, 196-204; X, p. 790b, B-C): «Qui 
enim scit quod omnis triangulus habet tres <angulos> aeque perfectam cogni-
tionem habet de ista veritate, ac si discurreret per omnes triangulos qui sunt in 
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Although Auriol on the one hand tries to defend Averroes 
from the attacks of  the theologians, on the other he must con-
cede that Averroes was mistaken to deny that God has a complete 
knowledge of  individuals66. Nonetheless he grants him the merit 
of  having recognised that God can be the cause of  all creatures 
through the knowledge of  a single object, his own essence. The 
key moment for Auriol lies in the different conception of  divine 
causality: for Auriol as much as for Averroes there needn’t nec-
essarily be a direct similarity between cause and effect. Take for 
example a body’s heat, which is caused not only by fire, but also 
by stars and movement. The heat of  fire remains the principle, 
which founds, regulates and measures each concrete manifesta-
tion of  heat in natural bodies: it is their exemplar67 cause.
Averroes’ theory serves Auriol in order to reject the Aristo-
telian principle omne agens agit sibi simile, which claims that any 
cause always produces an effect somehow similar to itself  and 
which the Scholastics applied to the relation of  similarity be-
tween God and creation68. According to this pattern of  creation, 
the effect pre-exists in the cause in the form of  idea-exemplar, 
which serves as the model for the resulting creation, just as the 
project of  a house in the mind of  an architect is the pre-exist-
ing model, the foundation upon which the architect builds the 
house.
Auriol’s exemplarism, by contrast, does not entail a direct 
correspondence between archetype and copy, since there can be 
pulvere vel in aere vel in latere. Non enim accrescit sibi aliqua notitia quae faciat ad 
perfectionem. Si igitur Deus novit omnes veritates geometricas et mathematicas 
ac physicas, cognoscendo quidditates omnium specierum et earum proprietates, 
nihil ad eum sollicitari de individuis signatis, in quibus illae veritates particulariter 
designantur».
66. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 3, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 6, 294; X, p. 791b, F).
67. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 3, art. 1 (E-Scriptum, p. 5, 246-254; X, 
p. 791a, D-E). 
68. Cfr. Thomas de Aquino, Summa contra Gentiles, II, c. 45, p. 372.
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no correspondence at all between the divine essence and crea-
tures, based on something holding between idea and ideatum. 
Inasmuch as one single form has to be the exemplar cause of  all 
different beings, it follows that this form cannot exactly resem-
bles any of  them, for were it to accord with any one of  them it 
could no longer correspond to the others. In order to represent 
all of  them, it must represent no-one69. 
In order to explain this new model of  exemplar causality, Au-
riol has to resort to the formula of  aequivocatio. This presuppos-
es no assimilatio of  an idea, on the contrary it presupposes an 
“opposition”, that is, a link between two termini that belong to 
different genera and kinds. Auriol thus claims that
non est impossibile, nec repugnantiam aut contradictionem in-
cludens, quod sit aliqua forma quae, per suam simplicem ratio-
nem formalem, similitudo sit inter se dissimilium quidditatum 
et naturarum, similitudo tamen aequivoca et alterius speciei seu 
generis ab eo cuius est similitudo70.
There is no contradiction in saying that there is a form that 
alone and in itself  is the exemplar for manifold forms and specific 
natures that do not resemble one another. But this is only valid 
if  we assume that this form is an equivocal exemplar, i. e. one that 
does not resemble the things for which it serves as exemplar.
69. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 14, 702-707; X, 
p. 797b, E): «Non enim ex eo quod est simillima uni quidditati tollitur quin pos-
sit alteri esse simillima, pro eo quod simul stat in similitudine quod sit quidditati 
primae simillima, aequivoce tamen, et cum hoc eidem dissimillima, alioquin non 
esset aequivoca, cum aequivocatio et dissimilitudo sint idem. <Unde> [Cum Vb] 
non plus repugnat similitudini quidditatis quod sit eidem dissimillima, quatinus 
est similitudo alterius dissimilis quidditatis, quam quod sit dissimillima, quatinus 
est aequivoca». On the concept of  aequivocatio, see below. See also ibidem, d. 35, q. 
3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 12, 617-620; X, p. 796b, B) and d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, 
p. 15, 744-747; X, 798a, F).
70. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 13, 663-666; X, p. 797a, D).
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The difference between univocal, equivocal and analogical con-
cepts71, systematically worked out in Aristotle’s Categories72, was a 
tool of  fundamental significance for the discussion of  many philo-
sophical and theological problems, including causality. The three 
possible ways of  understanding a concept correspond to three dif-
ferent types of  causality: (i) An univocal cause leads to an effect that 
is similar to itself  and with which it shares the same nature and 
ratio, as in the case of  human reproduction. Father and son resem-
ble one another in that they are individuals of  the same species. (ii) 
An equivocal cause by contrast brings about an effect whose form 
differs from its own, as in the case of  heat and movement. The 
form of  heat that results from movement is not preexistent in that 
movement. The movement and the heat generated do not share 
the same form, they are not of  the same species and do not share 
the same ratio. But the heat in the movement and heat generated 
both belong to the genus of  heat. (iii) An analogous cause is partially 
univocal and partially equivocal, as it produces an effect that has 
the same form as it, but the form has a different kind of  being in 
the cause as it does in the effect. The most familiar example is that 
of  the architect. The idea of  the house exists in the mind of  the 
architect, but the house has a different kind of  being in his mind, i. 
e. the being of  an idea, and in reality. In the Middle Ages, the meta-
71. On the linguistic level, the distinction between univocal, equivocal, and analo-
gical expressions corresponds to the three ways in which a term can be understood 
when it designates a number of  different subjects: 1) If  it is used with the same 
meaning for all subjects that it designates, then it is univocal, as for example when 
one says “Socrates is a man” and “Plato is a man”. In both cases “man” designates 
“rational living being”. 2) If  a term has a different meaning for each subject that it is 
used for, it is used equivocally, as for example in the case of  “dog” which designates 
both the animal and the heavenly constellation. 3) If  the term has different meanings 
in the different ways it is used, but if  they are still to a certain extent related to one 
another, then it is used analogically, as for example when we speak of  “health” regar-
ding an animal or regarding food. In this case food is designated as “healthy” to the 
extent that it is in a causal relationship with the health of  the animal.
72. Aristoteles, Praedicamenta, 1, 1a1-12. 
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phor of  the architect was often used to explain the divine creation 
through ideas.
By means of  the model of  equivocation, Auriol is able to contest 
precisely this traditional model of  creation: equivocation requires 
no conformity of  the being to an idea, so there is no contradiction 
in the fact that the single ratio of  divinity is equivocally the exemplar 
cause of  different forms. Such a contradiction only would obtain 
in a univocal relation, which involves a one-to-one relation of  simi-
larity between idea and ideatum, i. e. only when one wants to insist 
on the Platonic idea of  correspondence between the being and the 
idea, which Auriol has sharply criticised73.
6. Concluding remarks
In Auriol’s new theory, Godhead is the sole terminus of  the divine 
intellection and therefore the sole pattern of  creation, similitudo 
eminens et aequivoca omnium naturarum. It is also an immediate simi-
litudo74: the intermediaries in the process of  creation, i. e. the ideas, 
73. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 14, 720-733; X, 
p. 798a, B): «Sed manifestum est quod contradictio non sequitur in aequivoca simi-
litudine, sed in univoca tantum. In univocis enim sequitur, si duo alba sunt similia 
tertio, quod sint similia inter se, pro eo quod similitudo fundatur super aliquo quod 
est eiusdem rationis in tribus. In aequivoca vero similitudine non fundatur assimi-
latio in aliquo quod sit eiusdem rationis. Nam […] illud quod est similitudo rosae 
est alterius rationis a rosa, et per consequens dissimile specifice. Et propter hoc non 
sequitur, si sit similitudo alterius, utpote lapidis, quod lapis et rosa sint similia, quia 
sic sunt similia in tertio, quod illa realitas in qua similes sunt, vel potius quae est 
similitudo amborum, est etiam quaedam dissimilitudo amborum, nec est eiusdem 
rationis aliquid reperibile propter hoc in ambobus. Et ideo non infertur quod ambo 
illa sint similia, participando in se aliquid unum et idem, quod sit eiusdem rationis. 
Ergo manifestum est quod similitudo aequivoca, dum tamen non sit arctata, potest 
esse per unum et idem simplex similitudo expressa dissimilium quidditatum».
74. Ibidem, d. 35, q. 3, art. 2 (E-Scriptum, p. 13, 648-649; X, p. 797a, A): «Deus 
est similitudo rerum omnium absque omni habitudine media seu respectu»; d. 36, 
q. 2, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 18, 985-989; X, p. 854b, F).
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of  the tradition have now been replaced by divinity itself, which 
is in a direct relation with the creatures, as it is in itself  forma pri-
maria et principalis et primum exemplar75. The feature of  imitability is 
granted to God’s essence alone. Yet this essence resembles none of  
the creatures in particular, as then it could not serve as the exem-
plar for all creatures.
Auriol unseats the principle of  a direct correspondence be-
tween ideatum and idea, which dates back to Augustine. In its 
place the relationship that links the creatures to God is defined 
as similitudo aequivoca. The doctrine of  similitudo aequivoca rep-
resents the swansong of  the traditional concept of  exemplar cau-
sality, which required a univocal correspondence between ideas 
and entities. This also constitutes a turning away from the view 
that the world was created according to immutable, pre-existing 
models in God.
The use of  connotation enables Auriol to safeguard the divine 
knowledge of  creatures. In recto God indeed knows only himself. 
But although the divine ratio is simple and undivided, it is still con-
noted with various meanings, which in turn refer to the creatures. 
Thereby the multiplicity of  beings is also known by God, without 
the mediation of  the ideas. But the elimination of  the ideas as the 
media of  the cognitive process at once entails the elimination of  
media from the process of  creation too: the various connotations, 
which safeguard the divine knowledge of  creatures, ultimately 
play no role in creation. They exclusively serve God’s knowledge 
of  creatures. But the sole exemplar for creation remains God’s es-
75. Ibidem, d. 36, q. 2, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 18, 972-981; X, p. 854b, D): «Est enim 
inconcusse tenendum quod tota ratio exemplaritatis et ideae residet in ratione deitatis 
[…] et per consequens deitas est omnium similitudo primaria et forma principalis, 
ut sic cadat omnis imaginatio et illorum qui opinantur quiditates ut cognitas habere 
rationem ideae et illorum qui dicunt hoc de respectibus imitabilitatum et eorum qui 
dicunt de rationibus absolutis circa divinam essentiam intellectis aut existentibus ex 
natura rei».
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sence. The connotations are not models, according to which God 
created the world, they are not specific rationes, that are the ground, 
ante rem, of  the differences given in material reality. As Perler has 
claimed, the esse obiectivum, which Auriol maintains in his theory, is 
no longer that on the basis of  which each being is what it is and is 
knowable as such, as it was for Scotus. It is no longer the result of  
the divine production of  the ideas, which are the eternal principles 
of  the intelligibility of  extra-mental things. It is rather a modus es-
sendi of  the present object of  knowledge, which only arises when 
it appears to the knower76. The divine knowledge of  creatures, as 
conceived by Auriol, seems instead to be close related with a form 
of  actual existence of  the world. It is not because it first becomes 
known through ideas that every being is then created, it is rather 
because things are actually known by God that they immediately 
conform to the divine essence: 
creaturae prout existunt in rerum natura, imitantur immediate 
deitatem et exemplantur ab ea; illud enim idem attingit deitas 
secundum rationem causae exemplaris quod attingit ut efficiens 
et ut finis, et aeque immediate. Est autem finis et efficiens crea-
turarum secundum esse extra, non quidem mediante esse cogni-
to earumdem, immo immediate, quare et erit exemplar ipsarum 
immediate. Unde creaturae non solum ut intellectae, immo ut 
existentes, sunt quaedam similitudines diminutae ipsius. Et con-
firmatur quia creatus artifex per eandem similitudinem existen-
tem in intellectu speculatur immediate formam arcae, et ipsam 
in materia immediate operatur. Unde forma domus existens in 
materia non solum similis est eidem formae relucenti obiective 
in mente artificis, immo ambae similes sunt speciei existenti for-
maliter in eius intellectu; et per consequens illa species habet ra-
tionem primarii exemplaris; utraque vero forma rationem ideati 
et exemplati. Et eodem modo intelligendum est in divinis.77 
76. Cfr. Perler, What Am I Thinking About?, pp. 72-89.
77. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum, d. 36, q. 2, art. 3 (E-Scriptum, p. 19, 989-20, 
1000; X, p. 855a, A-B).
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Auriol’s new concept of  exemplar cause doesn’t envisage any 
preexistent models for creation. The esse obiectivum of  the house 
only arises when to the intentional act of  the intellect, in which 
the architect imagines the house, the appearing being of  the ob-
ject, i. e. the house is added. Only then do they both, the subjec-
tive act of  the intellect and the object, conform to the esse appa-
rens, i. e. the esse obiectivum of  the real existing object. Only then 
does knowledge occur. It is the same in the divine sphere: the 
apparentiae obiectivae, in which God knows the creatures, only 
arise when the creatures actually appear to God. In other words, 
the apparentiae obiectivae are nothing else than the (at a specific 
point in time) real existing creatures insofar as they are actually 
known by God from all eternity, as abstracted from all time78.
78. In order to avoid divine necessitarianism and preserve human freedom, 
Auriol develops an innovative theory on future contingents and divine foreknow-
ledge. On this see C. Normore, Future Contingents, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. 
Pinborg (ed. by), The Cambridge History of  Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1982, pp. 358-81: 369-370; Id., Petrus Aureoli and his 
Contemporaries on Future Contingents and Excluded Middle, «Synthese» 96 (1993), pp. 
83-92; C. Schabel, The Quarrel with Aureol: Peter Aureol’s Role in the Late-Medieval De-
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